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Asia Pacific: Perspectives is a peer-reviewed journal published at least once a year, usually in April/May. It welcomes submissions from all fields of the social sciences and the humanities with relevance to the Asia Pacific region.* In keeping with the Jesuit traditions of the University of San Francisco, *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* commits itself to the highest standards of learning and scholarship.

Our task is to inform public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent views and ideas that promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and the dissemination of knowledge unreservedly. Papers adopting a comparative, interdisciplinary approach will be especially welcome. **Graduate students are strongly encouraged to submit their work for consideration.**

* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

A Battle for Minds: Regulating Buddhism in Sixteenth-Century Japan

by Ronald K. Frank, Ph.D.

Abstract

The article examines some of the idiosyncrasies of church-state relations in the Warring States (*sengoku*) period in Japan. "Church" means the formal and informal organizational structures binding ordained and unordained religious practitioners of various forms of Buddhism, while "state" refers to the more or less formalized administrative apparatus of independent daimyō domains (rather than the remnants of the old imperial state). It argues that traditional power holders tried to prevent any spontaneous large-scale group activities amongst commoners, religious or otherwise. By examining a wide range of anti-religious policies, it shows that repressive measures employed by Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu to control religious communities had been presaged by similar policies in the domains of daimyō throughout the sixteenth century.

In the temple chronicle of the Myōhōji, a small Buddhist temple in the shadow of Mt. Fuji, the entry for the year 1553 appears to be rather typical at first glance. The abbot recorded an unusual summer draught, and mention was made of the fortunes of war affecting this particular corner of eastern Japan. Yet the last sentence of the entry for that year deals with a very peculiar edict indeed. In the words of the abbot,

Lay priests, Shintō practitioners as well as peasants are all greatly distraught, since all those who had a master and failed to report this fact will have to pay a fine.¹

An edict to this effect had been issued by the ruler of Kai province² where the temple was located earlier that year. Although the Myōhōji was part of network of temples belonging to the prominent Nichiren sect whose members had gained fame as troublemakers throughout the land, technically it was still subject to the laws of Kai. Furthermore, the province was ruled by none other than the great daimyō Takeda Shingen (1521–1573), and he had on many occasions made it clear to everybody who was listening that no one, high or low, cleric or layman, could hope to escape the new order he had established in his domain. The abbot of the Myōhōji had thus every reason to take note; he must have known only too well that Shingen had the will and the resources to actually enforce the laws he made.

In this Shingen was a rather typical representative of the class of newly emerging semi-sovereign rulers of many of the "Warring States" that made up the political landscape of sixteenth-century Japan. These *sengoku daimyō* were in the process of defining their positions as legitimate bearers of "public authority" (*kōgi*). As such they were intent on transcending the limitations of being a mere landed warrior-aristocrat with a retinue of enfeoffed vassals and becoming instead the head of a (however miniature) state with political,

economic, administrative, and not least judicial powers not circumscribed by any higher authority.³

A major part of this process, indeed a crucial one, were the legislative efforts of many daimyō which constituted, in the words of Katsumata Shizuo, "a declaration of independence"⁴ from the moribund shogunal government in Kyoto. A characteristic feature of daimyō legislation was the fact that, apart from regulating the behavior of retainers, edicts and law codes were designed to apply to all inhabitants of the domain. The daimyō thus laid claim to control over a territory rather than over a group of people defined by status, occupation, or personal affiliation and vassalage.

Needless to say, the power of a daimyō grew to the extent to which he managed to limit and to circumscribe the freedoms and privileges of individuals, groups and institutions in his domain. Freedom of action was achieved by limiting the freedom of other potential actors. Of concern in this regard were of course first and foremost fellow warriors, especially those with long standing roots in a given locality. However, challenges could arise from non-warriors as well. Peasants and townspeople alike had become accustomed to a measure of self-administration and freedom of spatial as well as social mobility that resisted incorporation into a rigid administrative mechanism. Of all the potential threats to a daimyō's control that of fellow warriors was perhaps the most tangible.

But a more insidious challenge could always come from a different sector, one that we hasten to classify as "elite", namely the Buddhist clergy. Of all potential actors on the political scene of Sengoku Japan they alone were accustomed to a degree of economic and institutional independence on the national level that could effectively thwart attempts to incorporate them into regional polities. More importantly Buddhist sects not only frequently resorted to violent means to achieve their own political goals⁵, they could and frequently did provide an ideology for mass actions by commoners. In fact, perhaps the most important development in medieval Japanese Buddhism was the emergence of religious communities in which there was little discernible distinction between lay practitioners and ordained clergy. Buddhist monasteries, on the other hand, could be important allies in a daimyō's quest for legitimacy, since sponsorship of religious institutions had been a hallmark of wise and benevolent rule. Lastly, many daimyō themselves were devout Buddhists, Takeda Shingen and his adversary Uesugi Kenshin are the most famous examples. Thus it is tempting to assume that there were incentives for them to use their power to promote one sect at the expense of others. However, as we shall see, restrictive measures were as a rule not justified on doctrinal grounds. All of these factors had an impact on how daimyō were trying to rein in and regulate Buddhist institutions and practitioners. It should be mentioned that attempts to regulate clergy were made as early as the eighth century. The Taiho Code of 702 contains a whole section of "Regulations for Buddhist Monks and Nuns" consisting of 27 articles.

In the following we shall explore some aspects of that regulatory process in the domains of Eastern Japan, most notably those of the Takeda, and their neighbors to the north and south, the Uesugi and the Imagawa, respectively.

I. Regulators and Regulated

The Imagawa had been military governors (*shugo*) of Suruga and Tôtômi provinces⁶ since the early Muromachi period (1336–1573). Imagawa Ujichika (1473–1526) issued one of the earliest domain law codes (*bunkokuhô*), the Imagawa Kana Mokuroku in 1526. The house faded into relative obscurity after the unsuccessful attempt by Ujichika's son Yoshimoto (1519–1560) to occupy Kyoto in 1560 that resulted in the partial occupation of the Imagawa domain by Takeda forces.

The Takeda had been in charge of Kai province for generations when Takeda Harunobu, the future Shingen, ousted his father Nobutora in 1541. Ironically, the rather obscure Nobutora would outlive his famous son and his equally famous host in exile, Imagawa Yoshimoto. Shingen proceeded to become one of the most successful and famous sengoku daimyô, extending his domain over several provinces and issuing a domain law code, the *Kôshû Hatto* that was partially inspired by that of the Imagawa.

The emergence of the Uesugi as the actual rulers of Echigo province⁷ is a classic case of what has been called *gekokujiô* – “those below overthrowing those above” – a term used to describe the social upheaval of the Sengoku period. In this particular case, the deputy military governor (*shugodai*) of Echigo, Nagao Kagetora (1530–1578) “inherited” not only the domain of his former lord but also his illustrious family name. The last of the shogunal deputies of the East (*Kantô kanrei*), Uesugi Norimasa, “bestowed” both upon Kagetora (the future Uesugi Kenshin) in 1561. A contemporary and famous adversary of Takeda Shingen, Kenshin would become in the imagination of later generations the peace-loving antidote to his bloodthirsty neighbor Shingen. Although no comprehensive law code for the domain was issued, the surviving edicts from the Uesugi archives shed some light on the position of Buddhists in a domain ruled by a lay monk.

Most practicing Buddhists in sixteenth-century Japan subscribed to the notion that theirs was the age of *mappô*, the “End of the Law (dharma)”. This eschatological concept about the decline of the teachings of the Buddha and consequent inability of people to reach enlightenment through their own efforts (*jiriki*) had been widespread since the late Heian period (794–1185). Echoing the tendencies already inherent in the doctrines of both the Tendai and the Shingon school of Buddhism, a succession of great Buddhist masters of the Kamakura (1185–1333) and Muromachi (1336–1573) periods had emphasized new paths to salvation and created a number of schools that would dominate the religious landscape of late medieval Japan. Even more strongly than the established schools of Tendai and Shingon, Nichiren (Lotus), Jôdo (Pure Land) and Shin (True Pure Land) Buddhism stressed the concept of reliance on an “outside power” (*tarikiki*) in order to obtain enlightenment. In the age of *mappô* faith in the saving grace of the Buddha Amida or the Lotus Sutra came to be considered the most reliable path to salvation.

Needless to say, stressing the efficacy of one way over all others held the potential of developing concepts of heresy, intolerance, and sectarian strife. This was especially apparent in Nichiren's emphasis on the Lotus Sutra and in Rennyô's (1415–1499) interpretation of Shin Buddhist doctrine, the basis

for the Ikkô (Honganji) sect. In addition, these new sects openly renounced many tenets of monasticism, such as celibacy. Pure Land and Shin Buddhism thus not only blurred the line between laity and clergy in general, but openly endorsed the maintenance of lineage amongst their leadership.⁸ Individual itinerant religious practitioners (*hijiri*) were part of a movement (known as Yûgyô-ha or Jishû) that linked salvation with absolute obedience to the head of the order, thus imbuing religious authority with very concrete secular power. These “Protestant” characteristics of late medieval Japanese Buddhism, an accessible doctrine based on faith, few ethical constraints, and extreme sectarianism made for a dangerous mix in an age where “those below [were] overthrowing those above”. Intriguingly followers of both the Lotus and the True Pure Land sect often stressed the concept of personal effort (*jiriki*) in trying to overcome the “outside power” (*tarikiki*) of their overlords (Berry, 1994, 43–44). Another pun-like irony was perhaps less apparent to contemporary observers. Just as the idea of the “end of the law” (*mappô*) was central to popular Buddhist doctrine, Buddhist institutions and communities of believers were confronted with the beginnings of a new kind of law, albeit a very secular one, designed to limit their independence.

II. Immunity and Succession

Buddhist temples in sixteenth-century Japan were presented with challenges and opportunities that were not too different from what samurai and commoners were facing in an “Age of Warring States”. The breakdown of the administrative system centered on the courts of emperor and shogun had led initially to loss of sponsorships for established temples. However, daimyô could and frequently did support large Buddhist institutions, even outside their domains. Both the Imagawa and the Takeda, along with many other houses, were acknowledged as patrons of the Myôshinji, an important Rinzai Zen monastery in Kyoto (Colcutt, 1981, 128). The Takeda, along with their archenemies the Uesugi were also on the list of sponsors for the even more illustrious Daitokuji, head temple of the Rinzai Zen branch school of the same name.⁹ It would appear that sponsorship of nationally known Buddhist centers became an important step in obtaining or maintaining political legitimacy for daimyô.

On the other hand, large temple networks and individual temples could potentially capitalize on the political turmoil by enhancing and consolidating their land holdings and translating that economic power into military and political might as well. Most temples had enjoyed rights of immunity for centuries and had thus become landlords in their own right, protected at times by large formations of warrior monks. Furthermore, state support for the established schools such as Tendai and Shingon had been diminished since the fourteenth century, when the shogunate had begun to actively promote Zen and Shin Buddhism in part to limit the political power of the established temples and the impact of spiritual threats against the capital.¹⁰ It is conceivable that especially Tendai and Shingon temples would try to turn this situation to their advantage and find the severance of relationships

with a central government beneficial to their aim of consolidating their land holdings.¹¹ A sense of urgency and crisis among the large Buddhist establishments arose from the competition from Lotus or Ikkō sectarians, whereas the breakdown of the centralized political order might present an opportunity to capitalize on long standing privileges.

Daimyō such as the Imagawa, Takeda, and Uesugi addressed both sets of “Buddhist” issues in their legislation. On the one hand, they were trying to control established temples and to incorporate them into the fiscal and administrative structure of the domain. On the other, they were concerned about curbing sectarian violence as a threat to public order and about establishing a working mechanism to police the actions of adherents of Buddhist sects. Daimyō regulations of Buddhist clergy thus had an institutional and fiscal dimension as well as an administrative and penal one.

There were many regulations dealing with issues of immunity from certain forms of taxation and from interference of daimyō officials in matters of internal temple administration. Article 22 of the Imagawa Kana Mokuroku of 1526 states:

As to immune lands, there should be no changes. But the proprietors tend to hinder the punishment [of criminals]. The lord has to carry out the punishment immediately after being informed by the authorities [about the crime]. Although this regulation already exists for several years, some proprietors continue to be negligent, therefore it is recorded here once again.¹²

Although this regulation dealt with all immune lands, the provision specifically applied to temples. Rather than just confirming existing privileges, however, the law was indeed trying to circumscribe the discretion of holders of immune land by requiring them to take action against criminals who might have taken refuge on their estate. Discretionary judicial privilege was thus in effect turned into an obligation to render justice according to domain standards.

Traditionally, the concept of immunity from official action had most commonly implied exemption from assessment through land surveys and thus in effect freedom from land-based taxation. A document signed by Takeda Nobutora, Shingen’s father guarantees the Kōsaiji temple the following privileges:

- Item: That the samurai chamberlain shall not enter.
- Item: That the land steward (*jitō*) and county assessor (*daikan*) shall do likewise.
- Item: Trespassing on mountains and forests shall be punishable.
- Item: No correspondence with monks shall be allowed without consent of the abbot.
- Item: Foot soldiers shall not enter.
- Whosoever violates these regulations shall be punished.¹³

This regulation affirms all elements of regular immunity privileges (*funyūken*). Although the date is not recorded, it was clearly issued before its author’s ouster as daimyō in 1541. Communications to temples by his successor Shingen, however, as a rule mentioned only exemption from specific taxes, thus implying that general rights of immunity were no longer recognized by the daimyō. By mid-century all cultivated land as well as buildings in the domain were subject to taxes unless specifically exempted.

The same was true for the Imagawa domain. The 1526 code had already abolished all immune land within the provincial capital of Sumpu. The Supplementary Code (Imagawa Kana Mokuroku Tsuika) of 1553 clarified the daimyō’s (Imagawa Yoshimoto) position on immunity privileges once and for all:

The older regulation about the immunity from the entry of shugo official was enacted at a time when the house of the Shogun ruled over the whole realm and shugo were appointed to every province. Holding the right of immunity from the entry of shugo officials one could disregard the shugo’s command. Now that by and large the land has been given laws by virtue of our own might and peace and order have been restored it cannot be that the shugo’s hand should not reach every corner.¹⁴

Matters of succession to the position of abbot had traditionally been handled either inside the temple or by a superior temple of the same school. Evidently in order to curb perceived “abuses” of the discretion to appoint temple officials Article 29 of the earlier Imagawa code stated:

It is henceforth forbidden that priest might give temples to people they claim to be their pupils, without checking the knowledge and ability of the person in question. However, the concrete circumstances have to be taken into consideration.¹⁵

By the time the second Imagawa code was issued in 1553, there already existed an official for Buddhist temples (*tera bugyō*) who appointed qualified candidates as abbots of “protection temples” (*kiganji*) that were supposed to pray for the well-being of the province. Such a position was apparently a profitable sinecure, since such temples were endowed with taxable land by the daimyō. It should not be forgotten that as landlords temples were of course recipients of taxes as well as taxpayers. Article 18 made clear that abbots of such temples were little more than civil servants:

It is very high-handed and unlawful for abbots of protection temples to change their way of life without proper reason and give their temple to other people. If a monk neglects his duties and therefore returns to worldly life, the temple is to be confiscated and the official for temples shall deal with the matter. A qualified abbot shall be appointed.¹⁶

In the Uesugi domain the tendency appears to have been to charge all established temples with offering prayers for “peace and security of the state” (*kokka anzen*). When in 1560 an edict offering tax relief for residents of the provincial capital was published, its first article stated:

As for the dues from temple and shrine land, even though people from the city are exempted from them, [the temples and shrines] shall not be negligent in prayers for the peace of the state, regular religious ceremonies, repairs, etc.¹⁷

This regulation is illustrative of yet another measure designed to subordinate temples to the authority of the daimyō. By controlling the temple’s access to dues payable by its peasants, the daimyō could effectively control the purse strings of a hitherto autonomous economic entity in his domain. It should not go without mention, however, that in controlling the flow of tax revenue to temples the daimyō was following a precedent established by central authorities since the Heian period. Recognition and circumscription of propri-

etary rights of temples had been a point of contention between them and the shogunal government, especially with the onset of the Muromachi period. While secular powers would often emphasize their desire to protect a temple's assets and assure receipt of dues, religious institutions quite justifiably saw the matter as an encroachment upon immunity rights.

It would appear, then, that a sengoku daimyō's policies towards temples closely mirrored the measures directed at limiting the independence of vassals. Individually powerful warriors in the Imagawa, Takeda, and Uesugi domains saw their autonomy as landlords greatly diminished by limitations on their immunity privileges. Land holding became more and more conditional on the rendering of service, military service in the case of samurai and "prayer service" in the case of temples. The daimyō tried to control his vassals' and temples' access to the wealth their land provided and even interfered in matters of succession and inheritance. It could be argued that in doing so a daimyō would enhance his legitimacy by following a precedent established by central authorities.

III. Mobility and Security

As necessary as these measures were with regard to the administrative and fiscal coherence of the domain, no daimyō could ignore the considerable threat to internal stability by elements that were notoriously hard to control, namely itinerant religious practitioners and sectarian adherents. Religious squabbles had the potential to destabilize a domain, while individuals with no fixed residence or status posed a very concrete security risk. Measures to control their movement and to curb sectarian violence had to take into consideration the fact that for the most part they were directed at adherents of widely popular beliefs. For the time being, most daimyō lacked the power to deal with manifestations of religious fervor the way Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi would towards the close of the Sengoku period.

That the problem was ubiquitous is amply illustrated by the sheer amount of rules and measures directed at Buddhist "trouble makers". The following is an early example:

Item: Gatherings are prohibited for all times in accordance with the command of Lord Takaoka.¹⁸

Item: To revive any particular sect without due cause is a frivolous act.

[...]

Item: Those who do not report large gatherings of either lowly peasants or sect members shall be punished.

Item: In case of a religious quarrel or insurrection, those who report it shall receive the house of the culprit as a reward.

[...]

Item: Negligence by officials in the past has almost led to ruin, if therefore in the future associations with any sects are not reported and hence not known, this will be detrimental to the country (*kuni*) and against the law. Any official guilty of this shall be demoted for his entire life.

Item: If a sect is discovered on immune land under official jurisdiction, house and land shall be given to the informer after the steward (*jitō*) has been told of the matter.

The above articles shall be followed to the letter by everybody, down to the very last child, nobody may infringe upon these regulations.

It is thus ordered.¹⁹

This edict was issued in Echigo in 1521. The concern with sectarian activities can be explained by the close geographical proximity of Kaga province, a Honganji stronghold. It should be noted that no attempt was made to outlaw membership in a religious order. Rather, the author Nagao Tamekage, Uesugi Kenshin's predecessor as *de facto* daimyō of Echigo, was concerned that potentially dangerous activities and affiliations with popular sects (read: Honganji) should be reported. By mid-century the police powers had been better organized, as this edict suggests:

Item: On the day of the Buddhist town festival, people crossing the Eastern small bridge must be reported to the authorities.

Item: People who shall not cross [bridges and river fords]: All sorts of priests, actors, blind singers and outcasts (*hinin*) shall not be allowed to receive a permit.

The above are regulations concerning the passage over bridges, the number of people crossing these has to be diligently reported, and if by any chance there should be an offender amongst them, he has to be singled out. It is thus ordered.²⁰

This regulation clearly seeks to limit the freedom of movement of those able to exert considerable influence over the minds of a potentially large audience, either by means of preaching a religious doctrine or by performing. No specific sect is mentioned, "all sorts of priests" are equally suspicious. While it was obvious that wandering folk might actually be agents in the service of some neighboring domain, the tone of the edict is indicative of the general tendency to view spatial mobility as almost as undesirable as social mobility. Itinerant priests could perhaps be dangerous agitators or even spies, but they were definitely not the kind of subject the daimyō desired: registered taxpayers. Furthermore, a landed aristocracy relies on the labor of peasants. When there is a shortage of working hands as is likely in times of warfare, non-economic measures are often used to bind peasants to the land. The existence of organizations that would make it easy for a peasant to abscond undetected is consequently highly undesirable from the point of view of the lord. Buddhist sects, especially the Lotus and Honganji schools devoted to a doctrine of equality, made it easy for people to shift in and out of the status of clerics and were thus by definition subversive of the existing order.

As "renouncing worldly life" became a convenient and often used escape route for mistreated peasants, debtors, and criminals, the issue caught the attention of daimyō legislators. Thus the Takeda code of 1547 expands the regular "order to return people" (*hitogaeshi-rei*) in the following manner:

If somebody incurred debts and wanders around the land after having renounced worldly life or simply absconding, his guilt should not be considered minor. Somebody who gives shelter to him has to be held responsible for the debts.²¹

Joining a religious order to escape any worldly obligation was thus in violation of secular law. Furthermore, joining an order did not erase obligations incurred previously. Curiously enough, however, the same code contained provisions that appear to prohibit the opposite, namely the entering of itinerant priests into relationships of obligation with a secular counterpart. Thus article 52 makes it illegal for unaffiliated Shintō and Buddhist priest to "have a lord". It states further that violators will be prevented from wandering around the

land. The rationale behind this rule is quite obviously twofold. It prevents people from switching their allegiance from one overlord to another by way of “renunciation”, and it prevents lords from acquiring work force or military personnel “off the books”, thus enhancing daimyō control over samurai and commoners at the same time. This is also the reason for the curious levying of fines quoted at the outset. This measure was clearly in full accordance with the law of the land. Shingen did indeed have a propensity for turning security concerns into fiscal benefits. His most ingenious invention was a “marriage tax” for Buddhist clergy. According to this regulation, monks who were not celibate, or rather people joining a religious order while continuing to be married were assessed an annual fine. Needless to say, this measure was directed primarily against followers of the True Pure Land and the Lotus sect, both of which had renounced monasticism.

The Takeda are, however, also renowned for having been early patrons of perhaps the most itinerant order of Pure Land Buddhism, the Jishū or Yūgyō sect. Its founder Shinkyō (1237–1319) was apparently corresponding with the Takeda family, among others.²² This sponsorship continued throughout the Sengoku period, in part due to the precedent set by the shogunal court and in part due to the location of Zenkōji temple network in Shinano province,²³ a territory conquered by Shingen early in his career.

Buddhist clerics in Sengoku Japan were nevertheless likely to encounter obstacles to their freedom of movement and restrictions on how, when, where and to whom to preach. Daimyō regulations were designed to separate itinerant practitioners from the rest of their subjects to the extent that that was enforceable. Although the regulations are outwardly directed against the obvious culprits, namely people refusing to “fit in”, it must have been clear to everyone involved that the goal of policing their actions was ultimately unobtainable. The real aim of these laws was thus once again a larger measure of control over both vassals and subjects, whose loyalty might be compromised by “dangerous doctrines”. In any event squabbles between adherents of Pure Land Buddhism and those of “the Nichiren thugs” (in Shingen’s words) would continue for the time being regardless of the laws laid down by lay priests bent on absolute power.

IV. Conclusion

The sengoku daimyō present a transitional stage in the process of establishing state control over religious institutions. Policies intended to limit the power of temples were adopted by the Ashikaga shoguns early in the Muromachi period. Some of the measures taken were comparable to what sengoku daimyō would attempt later on. In fact, the most successful daimyō appear to have copied policies of the shogunate (e.g. the elimination of toll barriers) as well as those of the temples (land surveys). Consistent implementation of such measures on the national level remained beyond the reach of the likes of Shingen and Kenshin. They shared the aspirations of the Ashikaga shoguns regarding Buddhist religious institutions, which would eventually be realized only by their Tokugawa successors.

ENDNOTES

1. Myōhōjiki, Tenbun 22. For the original text see *Takeda shiryōshū* [Collection of Takeda Sources], Shigeo and Harunori, eds., p. 55.
2. Present day Yamanashi prefecture.
3. For the purposes of this article, “Sengoku” refers to the time period 1467–1590. John W. Hall’s classic typology of the daimyō distinguishes three developmental stages for this time period. See John W. Hall, “Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo,” in Hall and Jansen, eds., *Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan*. While acknowledging the continued validity of Hall’s observations, I apply the term “*sengoku daimyō*” to the rulers of independent domains both prior to and during the unification period in the late sixteenth century.
4. Katsumata Shizuo (with Martin Colcutt), “The Development of Sengoku Law,” in Hall et al., eds., *Japan before Tokugawa*, p.104.
5. The followers of the True Pure Land (or Shin) school distinguished themselves as particularly unruly since their takeover of an entire province in the late 15th century. Their “League of the Single-Minded” (Ikkō Ikki) was perhaps the best known mass movement of pre-modern Japan.
6. Present day Shizuoka prefecture.
7. Present day Niigata prefecture.
8. See Thornton, Charisma, p. 18.
9. The roster of sponsors included even Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who would later become known as the great unifiers of Japan. For a complete list, see *ibid.*, 127.
10. On the history of religious protests in early medieval Japan, see *The Gates of Power*, Adolphson.
11. Adolphson sees in the land surveys conducted by Shingen temples in the late fourteenth century a direct precursor of similar daimyō policies 150 years later. See *ibid.*, 326.
12. Original text in Ishii Susumu et al., eds., *Chūsei seiji shakai shisō* [Medieval Socio-Political Thought] (hereafter CSS), vol. 1, p.197.
13. The translation is based on the original text in *Kōfu shi shi: Shiryō-hen* [History of Kōfu City: Sources] vol. 1, Doc. No.226, p.521.
14. CSS, 205.
15. *Ibid.*, 198.
16. *Ibid.*, 204.
17. *Niigata kenshi, Shiryō hen 3, Chūsei 1* [History of Niigata Prefecture: Sources, vol.3, Middle Ages, Part 1] (hereafter NKS), Doc. No.276.
18. Nagao Yoshikage (1459–1506) was shugodai of Echigo and ancestor of Uesugi Kenshin.
19. NKS, Doc. No.275.
20. NKS, Doc. No.3387.
21. Article 41. For the original text see Satō Shin’ichi, Ikeuchi Yoshisuke and Momose Kesao, eds., *Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū*, vol. 3, *Buke kahō* [Sources of Medieval Legal History, vol.3, Military House Laws] p.212.
22. See Thornton, Charisma, p. 18.
23. Present day Nagano prefecture.

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